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Bernardo venturi 
introduCtion
Literature on peace dynamics is pre-
dominantly focused on top-level 
actors. This is also true for the age-old 
Moldova-Transnistria conflict. The 
aim of this paper is to shift the analysis 
on how Civil Society Organizations 
(CSOs) contributed and are still con-
tributing to the de-escalation—or, 
at least, to a non-escalation—of this 
“frozen conflict.” We will evaluate the 
relative effectiveness of these actors, 
both on peacebuilding activities and on 
the influence on peacemaking efforts. 
Some key questions guided the 
study: how do CSOs, as mid-level 
and grassroots actors, impact conflict 
dynamics in Moldova? What is the 
interaction between CSOs with local 
institutions and with international 
organizations? What types of initiatives 
are undertaken by local CSOs in order 
to influence peace efforts?
this article examines the role of 
civil society organizations (Csos) in 
the Moldova-transnistria conflict. 
after a violent conflict in 1992, 
transnistria became a de facto, 
but unrecognized state. While 
much has been written on the 
official diplomatic processes for the 
settlement of this conflict, little has 
been written on the contribution 
of Csos. the article focuses on 
concrete projects for peace run by 
activists from both the Moldovan 
and transnistrian sides. the study 
states that the intervention by Csos 
were in place and they have played 
a relevant role since the mid-1990s. 
However, the situation of Moldovan 
civil society has kept organizations 
from exclusively focusing on peace 
and conflict resolution. this has 
limited the know-how in the 
field, which is still low. Moreover, 
political institutions are giving little 
support to this specific work. the 
main exception in the last years is 
the eu, which is showing a new 
interest in involving Csos in conflict 
resolution. 
university of Bologna
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In order to tackle these questions, this paper proceeds in four parts. We 
start by outlining the Moldova-Transnistria conflict. We then describe the 
situation of the Moldovan and Transnistrian civil societies and their changes 
during the last two decades. The subsequent section examines some theoreti-
cal issues on CSOs working for peace, with a specific focus on the former 
Soviet Republics. Finally, we specifically consider the contribution of CSOs 
to the peace process in Moldova, presenting the most important case studies. 
These issues are addressed by combining a selective analysis of the 
documents, research in the field and secondary literature on conflict reso-
lution and transformation applied to the empirical cases of civil society 
engagement in Moldova-Transnistria. In conclusion, a plea is made for 
research that includes both theory and data, mixing quantitative data and 
qualitative analysis, in order to produce new insights in the peacebuilding 
and peacemaking sector.
One last preliminary remark: in writing this article, we kept in mind the 
importance of bottom-up reality checks. During a round of interviews in 
Ingushetia in 1995, Valery Tishkov (1999: 588) was asked by one inter-
viewee: “Why are we living an everyday life here which is so very different 
from what is said about us?” Questions like this one, which we heard so 
often during field research, encouraged us to stay close to reality.
tHe Beginning of tHe ConfliCt and never-
ending diploMaCy 
The situation of the Transnistrian1 region in Moldova is considered a frozen 
conflict due to its unresolved and static condition since 1992. Transnistria 
is de facto independent and provides the region with many visible state-like 
attributes as well as a separate “national” identity; however, no other state 
has recognized it. 
The roots of the Transnistrian conflict are much older than the collapse 
of the Soviet Union (Hensel, 2006). Over the last centuries, the whole 
Bessarabia region—of which Moldova is a large part—was in contention 
between Romania and the Russian Empire since before the USSR.2
The language problem was a litmus test (Nantoi, 2009): the fears of 
Russian-speaking Moldovan citizens, supported by Soviet authorities to 
slow the break-up of the Soviet Union, played an important role during 
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the 1980s (Hensel, 2006), and the ghosts of lost language rights supported 
the Transnistrian declaration of independence from the rest of Moldova 
in September 1990. After more than one year of confrontation, the esca-
lation of tension between the Moldovan government and the separatists 
culminated in an armed conflict of significant scale on 19 June 1992. The 
intervention of the Russian Army forced the condition for a cease-fire in 
July 1992, but the search for a lasting peace is still ongoing. 
In 18 years, many official diplomatic efforts have sought a feasible solu-
tion. In order to understand the grassroots work for peace, it is useful to 
have a bird’s-eye view on how the negotiation process has changed over 
time. It is reasonable to split this high-diplomatic work into four periods 
characterized by different approaches and diplomatic strategies (Botan, 
2009). Firstly, the “Post-war Period” 
(1992-1996) started on July 27, 1992 
with the cease-fire and the signing of an 
Agreement of Peace Settlement between 
Russia and Moldova. This is the only 
period during which the Transnistrian 
representatives were not involved in the 
negotiation. 
During the “Period of Equality of 
the Parties” of the negotiation process 
(1997-2000), two significant agreements were signed. A first Memorandum, 
agreed on in 1997, stated that Moldova and Transnistria were equal par-
ties in the process of building up a common state. The expression “equal 
parties” is quite unusual for this kind of circumstance in which one side is 
totally unrecognized by other states. The second accord of this period was 
signed at the OSCE Summit in Istanbul, and committed Russia to withdraw 
its troops from Transnistria by the end of 2002. 
The “Kozac Memorandum” is the key document of the “Confrontation 
Period” (2000-2005). The presidents of Moldova and Transnistria declared 
their intention to sign this agreement drafted by the Russian Federation 
and based on the principles of a united federal state. However, due to 
strong pressure from the USA, the EU and OSCE and to mass protests, 
the Moldovan President Voronin refused to sign, just the day before. The 
most controversial issue in the memorandum, prepared by the Russian 




of independence from 
the rest of Moldova in 
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experts under the guide of Dmitry Kozak, was that Transnistria would 
maintain all its state administrations and it would acquire veto rights for 
all the institutional reforms of Moldova. 
Finally, the “Period of Internationalization of the Negotiation Process” 
(2005-onwards) has been increasingly conditioned by global actors, such 
as the EU and the USA. The study will show how these actors are becom-
ing more important also for CSOs working for peace. The negotiation 
took the “5+2” format, involving around the same table the Russian 
Federation, the USA, the EU, Ukraine, OSCE, plus, of course, Moldova 
and Transnistria. The more concrete result of this period is a joint statement 
between Moldova and Ukraine aimed at controlling the goods in transit 
across the common border of these countries. This agreement—signed at 
the end of 2005 and forcing the use of 
Moldovan customs documents even for 
the companies based in Transnistria—
was the beginning of the “European 
Border Assistance Mission” (EUBAM) 
refinanced until 2011. 
All these periods are characterized 
by two common elements: the sign-
ing of agreements and the presence of 
the Russian Army in Transnistria. This 
“high-level process” is in the middle 
between, on the one side, political and 
economic interests of local elites, and, 
on the other side, rivalry for international influence (Botan, 2009). This 
negotiation process has made very little progress to date: the conflict is 
still frozen and a solution similar to the Gagauzian district is still far away.3 
At the same time, the bottom-up work for peace and conflict resolution 
promoted by the Moldovan civil society is growing, and this study shows 
how it could have contributed to avoid the eruption of direct violence. 
Civil soCiety in Moldova 
In order to analyze whether grass-roots activities for peace in Moldova have 
a concrete impact, it is essential to highlight the mean features of Moldovan 
The bottom-up work 
for peace and conflict 
resolution promoted by 
the Moldovan civil society 
is growing, and this study 
shows how it could have 
contributed to avoid 
the eruption of direct 
violence.
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civil society, in particular in the Transnistrian districts. Some features are 
similar to other former Soviet Republics. However, in the last two decades, 
peculiarities have come out. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, civil 
society had a hard time to emerge and consolidate, insofar as Soviet people 
had no experience in building civil institutions (Mikhelidze, Pirozzi, 2008). 
It is possible to identify the main general causes of these difficulties. Firstly, 
because citizens in communist USSR were often coerced into volunteer-
ing, many still consider volunteering and civic engagement as something 
to be avoided. Only youngsters, born in the second part of the 1980s, 
have been volunteering in the last decade without this approach. Secondly, 
civil society in this region emerged as 
an anti-systemic (state) movement for 
popular mobilization in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s and was instrumental in 
peoples’ revolutions ending communist 
rule in the region (Mati, 2008: 17). 
Hence, often the relationship with the 
state is adversarial, and the connection 
with the private sector is weak. Finally, 
foreign donors and the strings attached 
to contributions created strong depen-
dency on international actors. Notably, 
civil societies lost their own local con-
stituencies and part of their grassroots 
energy. Many NGOs were created in the 
new states only to pursue international 
money (Mati, 2008).
Nevertheless, Moldovan civil society today looks livelier than in some 
other post-Soviet countries (USAID, 2008). Even if international depen-
dency is still quite predominate, CSOs in Moldova are political actors that 
cannot be considered only as a shadow of other powers. This comparatively 
good development of civil society is also a consequence of the fact that 
Moldova had one of the most robust democratic political systems in the 
former Soviet Union outside of the Baltic republics (Way, 2002). 
Moldovan civil society is therefore well developed in some aspects, 
but still weak in others (Hensel, 2006; USAID, 2008). A range of real 
Because citizens in 
communist USSR were 
often coerced into 
volunteering for social 
organizations, many still 
avoid civic engagement. 
Only youngsters, born 
in the second part of 
the 1980s, have been 
volunteering in the last 
decade without this 
approach. 
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and effective NGOs exists, and social actors are providing assistance to the 
government, defending civil rights and lobbying for transparency (Hensel, 
2006). In April 2009 the reaction by many Moldovans to the results, and 
to the presumed gerrymandering in the national election, showed a wide-
spread desire and attitude from the young generation to participate actively 
to the political life of the country. The so-called “Twitter Revolution” of 
April 7 asked for reforms, greater transparency and the possibility to discuss 
alternative political options. The main local CSOs were also involved in a 
coalition devoted to be on the lookout for fair Parliamentary elections in 
the two rounds that took place in 2009.4 In general, collaboration between 
government and civil society has expanded (USAID, 2008).5 
Today the main limits of Moldovan civil society are rooted in the 
country’s economic and social structure. 
The economic context is still extremely 
fragile. Consequently, the society is 
affected by a bleeding: one million citi-
zens live abroad, many of them youth, 
in percentage one of the biggest in the 
European continent; 36.2 percent of 
GDP comes from remittances, the world’s 
most remittance-dependent economy 
together with Tajikistan (Ratha, Xu, 
2008; Mosneaga, 2009). Staff turnover 
is still high: frequently young leaders 
leave their organizations to study or work 
abroad. This is one of the reasons that 
can explain the lack of sustainability for long-term programmes (Doroftei, 
Nantoi, 2009).6 The Transnistrian districts are not spared the depopulation 
process, which is actually stronger, and is having disastrous socio-economic 
implications (Fomenko, 2009).
Data are not very helpful to fully understand the Moldovan and 
Transnistrian civil society. In Moldova a total of 7,000 NGOs are registered, 
both at the national and local levels (USAID, 2008),7 but only some of 
them are active and stable. In addition, the legislative system discourages 
CSO registration, it does not help external foundations to make donations, 
and day-by-day bureaucracy is still very complex. 
Data are not very helpful 
to fully understand 
the Moldovan and 
Transnistrian civil 
society. In Moldova a 
total of 7,000 NGOs are 
registered, both at the 
national and local levels, 
but only some of them 
are active and stable. 
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Furthermore, the concept of civil society in the post-communist coun-
tries of Eastern Europe and Eurasia was the subject of a high international 
attention from political actors, scholars and donors, but its dynamics remain 
difficult to define and even more difficult to measure (Petrova, 2007). 
Qualitative studies are therefore able to demonstrate the importance of civil 
society on some post-Communist contexts, but the quantitative literature 
has generally lacked a measure of the organizational reality of civil society. 
Moreover, quantitative studies are limited to some selected and easier cases 
studied and compared frequently (Petrova, 2007). Often Moldova is not 
among them, but we must have also some quantitative frames in order to 
better analyze the impact of CSOs in the peace process. One useful tool is the 
“NGO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia,” 
a comparative cross-national quantitative 
measure of civil society created by USAID 
in 1997. It estimates the strength and 
overall viability of the non-governmental 
sectors using seven different dimensions: 
legal environment, organizational capa-
city, financial viability, advocacy, public 
image, service provision, and NGOs 
infrastructure.8 The sustainability index 
for the Moldovan NGO system is 4.2, 
which is defined as “in mid-transition” 
(USAID, 2008). The stronger aspects of 
Moldovan civil society turn out to be advocacy, infrastructure; the weaker 
financial viability, legal environment and a low level of trust in NGOs. 9
NGOs are active in a broad range of fields, but almost 50 percent of 
them are involved in the social and educational sectors. The majority of 
active NGOs have broad missions in order to attract donor funds, but these 
wide areas of activities limit NGOs’ ability to build strong expertise and 
networks based on the needs of their constituencies (USAID, 2008). This 
“thematic approach” is well exemplified by the peace sector: almost no 
CSOs are working only on peace and conflict issues or on the Transnistrian 
status (Mirimanova, 2010) and the specific capabilities are still low. 
Public trust in CSOs is quite low, even if it has remarkably increased. 
In November 2009, 31 percent of the population had little or no trust in 
The stronger aspects of 
Moldovan civil society 
turn out to be advocacy, 
infrastructure; the 
weaker financial viability, 
legal environment and 
a low level of trust in 
NGOs.
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them and 34 percent of the population expressed relative or total trust10 
(IPP, 2009). This situation is due primarily to the low visibility of NGOs 
and their impact (IPP, 2009). To address this lack of trust, many Moldovan 
CSOs adopted of the “Code of Ethics” in March 2008 (Dura, 2010). The 
lack of trust in the NGO sector is also a high barrier for organizations 
working for peace when they try to build confidence among the Moldovan 
population. 
The legal framework is still not helpful for CSOs. Even if, for instance, 
Article 32 of the Constitution guarantees freedom of opinion and associa-
tion, the whole legal system is vague, and the many legislative gaps allow for 
corruption and arbitrary application of the law.11 Tax incentives to encourage 
individual and corporate donations are lacking,12 as are legal provisions to 
allow CSOs to engage in income-generating activities such as social enter-
prises or contracting with the government to provide consultancy or other 
services (IPP, 2007; USAID, 2008).13 
These issues are affecting all the 
CSOs working on peace, and they must 
be taken into account in order to analyze 
their potential and limitations in conflict 
resolution efforts.
transnistrian Civil soCiety
Transnistria’s civil society is clearly less active than in the other districts of 
Moldova. The local administration is indifferent towards CSOs acting at the 
social level, but it is against any political interference from civil society on 
the frozen conflict or on other issues. Therefore, the main fields of activity 
are limited to Education, Social protection, Youth problems, Sports and 
tourism, Human rights protection, Culture and arts, and Development 
of patriotism (Abramova, 2007). CSOs in Transnistria for the most part 
remain weak and play a limited role. Moreover, the unrecognized status 
of Transnistria has increased their international isolation.
In the period 1989-1996, public organizations were promoted by the 
government and they often had a military-patriotic orientation. A second 
period was characterized by independent CSOs (1996-2002) and the last 
one, 2002-2009, by increased civil activity (Lysenko, 2009).
To address this lack of 
trust, many Moldovan 
CSOs adopted the “Code 
of Ethics” in March 2008.
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In July 2009, 2,310 NGOs were registered in local bodies of Justice 
of Transnistria (Lysenko, 2009). However, a huge part of them are just 
nominal, and many can still be called “GONGO,” governmentally orga-
nized NGOs. Only around 20 organizations are properly functioning 
NGOs, five or six independently built up in recent years with the support 
of Moldovan or international partners (Hensel, 2006; Comai, Venturi, 
2009; Belitser, 2005). Consequently, they still have little capacity to push 
the Transnistrian administration toward a collaborative approach to the 
conflict (Hensel, 2006). 
The problem of depopulation, and therefore of closing CSOs and of 
leaders’ turnover, is extremely strong in Transnistria too. In the early 1990s, 
730,000 people were living in this region, but by 2008 they were 533,500, 
and, according to Moldovan statistical authorities, the total was of some 
410,000 people (Fomenko, 2009). The demographic situation is clearly 
controversial, but certainly this “demographic echo”—using Vladimir 
Fomenter’s expression—is one of the most important consequences of 
the conflict. 
The brainwashing in school or in other public environments of old 
myths and stereotypes pertaining to the Cold War epoch is another limit to 
the development of a plural civil society (Belitser, 2005). At the same time, 
many youth are studying or working in Chişinău or abroad for a period, 
and are not too influenced by the Transnistrian propaganda. This aspect 
is very relevant for peacebuilding initiatives, as it creates the conditions 
for the establishment of projects involving Transnistrian people without 
strong prejudices on Moldovan people. It is also relevant for these kind of 
initiatives that a relevant part of CSOs are also registered in Chişinău under 
Moldovan law, as it provides Transnistrian organizations with potential 
access to funds from national and international donors, whereas those 
registered in Tiraspol cannot access these funds directly, Transnistria not 
being recognized internationally or by the Moldovan government (USAID, 
2008). Notably, Igor Smirnov, the president of the separatist government, 
signed a decree in 2006 prohibiting foreign funding of CSOs registered 
in Transnistria. Specifically, CSOs were prohibited from receiving funding 
directly or indirectly from any international or foreign organization, foreign 
government, Transnistrian organization with a foreign capital share in 
excess of 20 percent, foreign citizen or stateless person, or any anonymous 
Moldova.indd   15 5/26/2011   10:36:33 AM
 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE
    VOL. XXVIII NO. 2  JUNE 2011
CSOs AND CONfLICT RESOLUTION: MOLDOVA-TRANSNISTRIA
16
source. The scope of the decree was later reduced to include only those 
organizations which are directly involved in political activities (Dura, 2010).
Several donors are interested in becoming involved with Transnistrian 
civil society. However, few outside actors are actually able to do so (Hensel, 
2006). At the same time, CSOs from the Moldovan and Transnistrian 
regions are strengthening their collaboration, even in the peace sector. 
For instance, in 2008, a National Forum of NGOs from Transnistria was 
organized for the first time. 
Finally, we highlight how many international studies and articles on 
civil society and civil rights in Transnistria contain some inaccuracies due to 
surface perceptions. For instance, Mikhelidze and Pirozzi wrote that “it is 
practically impossible to organize joint meetings, seminars or workshops with 
Moldovan counterparts” and “travel to the separatist region is restricted by 
the authorities” (2008: 38). In fact, many international (Soros Foundation, 
UK Global Conflict Prevention Pool, USAID, etc.) or Moldovan (CReDO, 
CONTACT, Foreign Policy Association, etc.) organizations are regularly 
working in partnership programs involving groups from both sides of the 
Nistru/Dniestr river. This element is significant in order to evaluate CSO 
contribution to the peacebuilding and peacemaking processes. 
Civil soCiety in ConfliCts and peaCe proCesses
CSOs have gained a great deal of popularity in the last two decades. For 
instance, the awarding of the Nobel Prize to The International Campaign 
to Ban Landmines in 1997 and to Medicins Sans Frontieres in 1999 has 
highlighted the emergence of these organizations as relevant forces in 
international politics (Ahmed, Shamina Potter, David M., 2006). In order 
to explore the role of CSOs working on conflict, it is essential to have a 
preliminary view on what “civil society organizations” are, and how far they 
can elicit policy-makers’ attention. It is obviously possible to find several 
definitions of CSOs. A useful one, for instance, according to the World 
Bank, is defining them as the “wide area of non-governmental and not-
for-profit organizations that have a presence in public life, expressing the 
interests and values of their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, 
political, scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations” (World Bank, 
2006). Another definition by the Civil Society Index (CSI) describes civil 
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society as “the arena, outside of the family, the state and the market where 
people associate to advance common interests” (Fioramonti, Heinrich, 
2007: 8). The latter description is helpful for our work because it defines 
the “arena” as external to common social institutions such as “family, state 
and market.” Besides, the CSI is presenting civil society as a political actor 
rather than an economic one, and it explicitly includes individual citizen’s 
actions such as participation, demonstrations, social movements and other 
“un- organized” forms of civic activism (Mati, 2008). We are therefore 
using the broader expression CSOs and not just NGOs even if in Moldova 
practitioners are often using the second concept as CSI is defining CSOs.
A broad-spectrum key issue to keep into consideration for a compre-
hensive understanding of civil society organizations working locally is how 
they are connected globally. This is because the process of globalization, 
increasingly developed in the last decades, has one of the most important 
dimensions at the civil society level, which 
may be considered also as “global civil 
society” (Kaldor, 2006). In this regard, 
in the Moldova-Transnistria scenario we 
have to consider all the actors involved 
(Russia, EU, etc.), their interests, and 
how they are interacting with or manipu-
lating the CSOs. 
One more dilemma of political theory 
on civil society, presented by different scholars, is to define “good” and 
“bad” organizations: civil society organizations may reject fundamental 
principles on which the state is organized (Phillips, 2002). This challenge 
for political theorists is accentuated in conflict areas in which civil society 
may be divided along the lines of the conflict, and in which both state and 
non-state actors use violence to further their aims (Bell, O’Rourke, 2007). 
However, this problematic aspect is not present today in Moldova, where 
episodes of organized violence are rare and where the same self-proclaimed 
Transnistrian State is illegal according to international law. In this context, 
one of the main dilemmas is rather to distinguish between “true” and “fake” 
civil society, as presented in the previous paragraph (Lysenko, 2009). 
It is also difficult to define the extent to which CSOs can influence 
political processes. However, it is widely accepted that CSOs play a crucial 
One more dilemma of 
political theory on civil 
society, presented by 
different scholars, is to 
define “good” and “bad” 
organizations.
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role in promoting good governance and people-centred development (Mati, 
2008). The last few decades have also seen a great shift in the perceived role 
of CSOs as an increasingly important player. A clear evidence of this process 
is a stronger recognition by individual governments as well as international 
organizations (Fioramonti, Finn, 2008; Tocci, 2008; Mirimanova 2010), 
a trend also clear in Moldova. 
More specifically, there has been a growing interest in the contribution 
of civil society to peace since the end of the Cold War. For instance, CSOs 
can play a crucial role going beyond negotiating interests to meet all sides’ 
basic needs because they often have better access to the parties involved in a 
conflict (Mikhelidze, Pirozzi, 2008; Bartoli 2009), and they can work for a 
lasting peace or for the reconciliation process.14 CSOs also have direct con-
nections with the many groups and individuals on the ground, and they may 
prepare strong conflict assessment and analysis. They may have a relevant 
role in all different stages of the conflict. However, their intervention is 
considered more effective in the efforts and activities at conflict prevention 
stage, and in post-settlement reconciliation and peacebuilding. Early warn-
ing systems, violence prevention, peace education, or the establishment of 
peace zones are examples of conflict prevention activities, while truth and 
reconciliation commissions, facilitation of dialogue among conflict groups, 
or reintegration of ex-military and paramilitary groups are common cases 
of post-conflict activities. In this article, therefore, it will be not directly 
considered the so-called “conflict sensitivity”, the roles and responsibilities 
of CSOs in the humanitarian and developmental sectors that started to be 
discussed in the mid-1990s (Anderson 1999), but the direct role that CSOs 
can play in peacebuilding and supporting diplomatic efforts. 
It is important to highlight two directions in the last two decades. Firstly, 
it is possible to find significant examples of intervention during the conflict, 
such as civil peacekeeping and confidence-building, even if we do not have 
such examples in Moldova. In these cases, it is quite frequent to witness a 
peer-to-peer cooperation between local civil society based in the conflict area 
and international NGOs working even in western civil society.15 Secondly, 
the peculiarities of the new wars (Kaldor, 2003) have changed the percep-
tion of pre- and post- conflict. In many complex and long conflicts—such 
as Israel-Palestine, Sudan, Colombia, etc.—it is simply impossible to distin-
guish these stages clearly. For this reason, it is also correct and sometimes 
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more appropriate to use the terminology “peacebuilding activities,” that 
for some international organizations—for instance the EU—is not merely 
post-conflict. This is quite clear even for the case study analysed in this 
article: the CSOs are post-conflict if it is considered the 1992 war, whereas 
it is conflict prevention if the risks of violence outbreak in the Transnistria 
region are taken into account.
Another distinction is that peace efforts can be conducted both on 
track one and track two (Diamond, 
McDonald, 1996; Williams, Fisher, 2007; 
Bartoli 2009). According to Williams, in 
Moldova, but also in similar conflicts, first- 
and second-track collaboration is possible 
and the approaches used by both types 
of actors are compatible and productive 
(William, 2005). Track two work is not 
seen as a substitute for official interac-
tions, but is regarded as supplemental 
and complementary.16 Notably, Bell and 
Rourke (2007) analysed 389 peace agreements (addressing 48 intra-state 
conflicts) and they noticed that only five intra-state processes did not men-
tion civil society in any of their peace agreements: Moldova-Transnistria is 
among them.17 
Cso projeCts for ConfliCt resolution in 
Moldova-transnistria
We will now analyze whether civil society in Moldova has made significant 
contributions to peacebuilding and to official peacemaking, using three 
different analytical frameworks with emblematic project examples. Firstly, 
the effects are analyzed using the five criteria identified by Ronald Fisher 
(Fisher 2007). Secondly, the framework developed by the “Research and 
Policy in Development” (RAPID) program at the Overseas Development 
Institute will be applied to this regional context. Finally, in the last paragraph 
the focus will be on how the political institutions—in particular a major 
player as the European Union—can improve the peacebuilding approach 
in Moldova through CSOs. These models, commonly applied to the whole 
In Moldova and in 
similar conflicts, first- 
and second-track 
collaboration is possible 
and the approaches used 
by both types of actors 
are compatible and 
productive. 
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civil society, are utilised mutatis mutandis choosing some aspects for this 
study in order to analyze the CSOs working on conflict transformation. 
One obstacle to this process is the absence of official statistics on this 
issue, and looking from the outside one may be tempted to conclude that 
CSOs do not engage this type of peace work.18 However, donor-based 
analyses are available and it is possible to utilise and combine the most 
relevant among them. Hence, a qualitative approach of key projects and 
actors contributes to understand the actual contribution of civil society 
organizations to the de-escalation of the Transnistrian conflict. 
Starting with the first analytical framework—the one proposed by 
Fisher—it identifies five criteria: “cognitive changes (e.g. realizations or 
improved attitudes); creative ideas or cognitive products (e.g. directions, 
options, recommendations); substantive products (e.g. joint statements of 
principles, written proposals); relationship changes (e.g. increased empathy, 
trust and cooperation); structural connections (e.g. participants becoming 
negotiators)” (Fisher 2007: 312). 
Fisher used this analytical framework to examine case studies in order to 
identify the links between unofficial and official interventions. The case study 
presented by Fisher in the Moldova-Transnistria scenario contributes to 
show that unofficial interventions made contributions to official peacemak-
ing through identified transfer effects. The case describes problem-solving 
workshops that took place from early 1993 to 1996 and were facilitated 
by a team of mainly academic scholar-practitioners associated with the 
Centre for Conflict Analysis at the University of Kent and the Foundation 
for International Security, based in London. Notably, Williams (2005) 
maintains that track two took over when track one was faltering and was 
able to provide useful input. In this project Joe Camplisson—a community 
development and conflict resolution specialist from Northern Ireland—and 
some of the specialists who had been assisting him formed the Moldovan 
Initiative Committee of Management (MICOM).19 Simultaneously, 
Camplisson’s local associates came together with the “Joint Committee for 
Democratization and Conciliation” (JCDC),20 whose membership equally 
drawn from Moldova and Transnistria. 
Is it possible to identify other examples of Fisher’s five criteria in 
Moldova? Two other case studies suggest that we should answer affirmatively 
to this question: the work done after 1996 by JCDC, and the “IMPACT 
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Project.” JCDC implemented “shuttle diplomacy” between the authorities 
and people of Moldova and Transnistria. Their non-nationalist attitude and 
openness to the search of different solutions within the entire spectrum of 
options, including self-determination for Transnistria, earned the JCDC 
respect and trust on both sides of the river (Mirimanova, 2010). 
In 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000 a JCDC-MICOM seminar series took 
place in Albena, Bulgaria. The main aim of the meetings was to facilitate 
collaboration between governmental and non-governmental sectors in 
Moldova and Transnistria, focusing on the troubles of ordinary people. It 
also aimed to “kick-start” the stalled process of negotiations between the 
two sides. The seminars were attended by different participants: NGO rep-
resentatives, local and national authority leaders, journalists, lawyers, busi-
ness people, military personnel, Moldovan and Transnistrian governmental 
officials, but also students, housewives, and mediating ambassadors from 
Russia, Ukraine, and from the Organization for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (OSCE). Two subsequent developments were attributed to 
the interaction between all these levels undertaken at the seminar: the 
resumption of the intergovernmental negotiations, and the reduction of 
peacekeeping troops in the security zone separating the two sides. Many 
non-governmental initiatives were also brought forward.21 
Cognitive changes, creative ideas or cognitive products, relationship 
changes, and structural connections were concretely present in these pro-
jects. The third of Fisher’s criteria—substantive products—was strongly 
present in Kiev at a more conventional seminar held in 2000 and organized 
by the same group. This session produced a common state document, which 
may be seen as a result of the fusion of track one and track two processes 
(Williams, 2005; Fisher, 2007).22
Another more recent example filling at least the first four criteria is 
the IMPACT Project.23 This project was developed for two years (2007-
2009) with the specific aim of strengthening joint work of analytical CSOs 
and independent expert analysts from the two banks of the river Nistru/
Dniester plus Russia, Romania and Ukraine. The main goal of this work was 
to develop a joint analysis of the socio-economic effects of the protracted 
political conflict and to develop policy proposals in order to contribute to 
developing effective strategies and options for transforming the conflict. 
The most substantive product of the project was the joint research on the 
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social and economic impact of the conflict and on the negotiation process 
(IMPACT, 2009).24 The research is showing the negative effects of the 
conflict on society and on the economy of both sides. The research is also 
relevant for its uniqueness: it is very hard to find such studies, mainly due 
to the absence of updated official data from Transnistria. At the same time, 
it presents the weaknesses and points of strength of the official diplomatic 
process. The final conference, held in Odessa, on 28-29 May 2009, was 
attended by all the main experts, local stakeholders and opinion leaders 
from both sides. 
The IMPACT project seems to answer positively even to the criteria 
identified by the RAPID Framework. The RAPID Framework aims to 
improve the use of research and evidence to influence policy processes 
and it facilitates the analytical focus on the relationship between CSOs’ 
policy influence and key factors. Particularly, it highlights the impor-
tance of four factors: political context, the links between CSOs and other 
important players, evidence generated through CSOs’ work and external 
influences (Start, Hovland, 2004). For these features, it may be a useful 
analytical tool in examining the relationship between CSOs and policy in 
post-communist countries (Fioramonti, Heinrich, 2007). The IMPACT 
Project took into consideration the political context and it tried to exploit 
institutional channels to contribute to policy-making. At the same time, it 
created well-constructed links between communities, networks and inter-
mediaries—such as the media25—in affecting policy change. Moreover, the 
collection of “evidence” was a key issue in the project, as shown by the 
expert essays. Finally, the impact of external influences, forces and donor 
actions on research/policy interactions were taken into consideration with 
direct contribution of external partners from Romania, Russia and Ukraine, 
and with the support of international experts. 
Are other projects responding to the RAPID Framework criteria? five or 
six local or international organizations are certainly working on programmes 
in this direction. However, only a few of them are focussed directly on 
peacebuilding or peacemaking. The analysis of the main donors is a useful 
approach to show some evidences. The “Department for International 
Development” (DFID) of the British Embassy based in Chişinău was one 
of the most active in the conflict resolution sector in the last years. In fact, 
one of its main goals is “strengthening the UK’s contribution to conflict 
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resolution and peacebuilding.” Among 79 completed projects of direct aid 
commissioned since 1991, 11 (13.9 percent)26 are on “Conflict Resolutions 
and Human Rights” and all of them clearly target the Moldova-Transnistria 
conflict (British Embassy in Moldova, 2010). Some project titles can be 
good examples: “Conflict Resolution and Community Development in 
Moldova,” “Strategic Conflict Assessment,” “Transnistrian Dialogues” or 
“The Peacebuilding Framework Project (PBF).” In particular, PDF—four 
years long (2003-2007) and with a large budget (£450,000)—is interesting 
for this research, as it was aimed at contributing to development through a 
range of peacebuilding activities designed to support conflict resolution in 
the country. One of the 4 key components was titled “Strengthening the 
Non-governmental Sector” (British Embassy in Moldova, 2010). Notably, 
many of the projects were contracted and directly implemented by local 
CSOs.27 
It is possible to conclude that 
the British Government—within the 
framework of the cutting edge Global 
Conflict Prevention Pool—was spe-
cifically devoted to the peace process on 
different tracks.28 Another organization 
working directly on peacebuilding is 
the Austrian Development Cooperation 
which collaborates with partners from 
Chişinău and Tiraspol in supporting a 
Centre for Peace Initiatives, Democracy 
Changes and Conflict Resolution, and organizing an International Summer 
School and Distance Learning since 2007. One ongoing project focussed 
on conflict resolution and peacebuilding is the project “Prevention of 
Ethnic Conflicts through Meaningful Educational Integration Policies” 
financed by the Dutch Foundation “Cordaid” and implemented by three 
Moldovan organizations.29 The project works on the prevention of ethnic 
and linguistic conflicts in Moldovan society through educational practices. 
The Cooperative Peace Project is a project aimed at strengthening capa-
city for peacebuilding work within Moldova-Transnistria CSOs. As part 
of this objective, one output of the project is a comprehensive document 
presenting the views, experiences, and proposals of the many sub-sectors 
In Moldova and in 
similar conflicts, first- 
and second-track 
collaboration is possible 
and the approaches used 
by both types of actors 
are compatible and 
productive. 
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of Moldovan-Transnistrian civil society (lawyers, academics, etc.) on the 
regional conflict.30
The Cooperative Peace Project is not the same kind of “work on 
conflict” project as those of other major donors implementing projects in 
Transnistria. Addressing socio-economic issues that are directly or indirectly 
linked to the existence of the conflict is considered in Moldova, but espe-
cially in Transnistria, as more important than finding a political solution to 
the conflict, and it is also easier to engage with Transnistrian authorities at 
this level (Dura, 2010). For instance, USAID (2001) is assisting political 
institutions and CSOs in Moldova by financing several projects, some of 
them implemented in Transnistria but none focussed directly on conflict 
resolution.31 Also, about 50 US Peace Corps volunteers present in the 
country are working on other issues, such as development, education, etc. 
Some other important donors working in Transnistria—such as the U.S. 
Embassy, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the Swiss 
Cooperation Office Moldova, UNFPA, and WHO—are targeting youth 
organizations, media, or health care. Others are working on different issues 
that may indirectly facilitate a de-escalation of the conflict. For example, 
the Embassy of the Czech Republic is working on “Reinforcement of 
the Civil Society—Building Contacts between the Transnistrian NGOs” 
and on “Stabilization of Potential Migrants through support of Small 
Entrepreneurship on both banks of the Dniester River”; or the Soros 
Foundation, supporting the development, consolidation, and coordina-
tion of CSOs and local communities on the two banks, paying particular 
attention to democracy and human rights.32 
tHe ContriBution of politiCal institutions 
In this section, we will make considerations as to how political institutions 
can improve the conflict resolution multi-track process through CSOs in 
Moldova. We have already considered the contribution of some Embassies 
and national governments as major donors for projects in Transnistria. The 
Moldovan government was always very engaged on the diplomatic level 
though the Ministry of Reintegration. However, it gave no contribution 
to CSOs working on conflicts. The Transnistrian authorities, as we have 
already seen, created many problems for the genuine local CSOs working 
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on issues related to politics, conflict or peace. OSCE has been mediating 
and facilitating peace processes in the region since the early 1990s from 
grass-roots level to high diplomacy. It financed several projects and sup-
ported local initiatives both financially and politically. 
However, the main actor that has political and economical opportu-
nity to improve the CSO peace activities is the European Union. How 
has the EU employed the instruments at its disposal to contribute to the 
resolution of the conflict in Moldova? Beyond the official negotiations, the 
EU’s neighborhood policy is active in many other ways. This wide range 
of activities is generally viewed as “Euromodernisation,” which represents 
a new model for conflict resolution that not only gives support to democ-
racy and governance, but various EU standards and forms of cooperation 
that may advance the peacebuilding agenda of governments facing internal 
conflicts (Doroftei, Nantoi, 2009). The 
European Border Assistance Mission 
(EUBAM), for instance, is a good exam-
ple of “soft power” concurrent to the 
negotiation process: Transnistrian com-
panies are pushed to register in Chişinău 
and in this way the economic power of 
the region is increasingly less dependent 
on Transnistrian political power. However, not having contacts with 
CSOs and opinion polls, the mission is still quite unknown and far from 
the people. Generally, a great part of the EU’s policy towards Moldova is 
focussed on internal reforms (i.e., constitution reforms) which can improve 
the attractiveness and capability of Moldova to effectively reintegrate the 
Transnistrian territory.
Notably, the EU objectives in conflict resolution are not explicitly 
stated in any public document. Effectively, the EU has taken over existing 
assistance programmes such as the UK’s Peacebuilding Framework on 
working with civil society without having undertaken clear conflict analysis 
(Doroftei, Nantoi, 2009). The society level in general has not been taken 
into wide consideration, partly because several small actors would not 
have the capacity to manage multi-million Euro projects at the community 
level. Consequently, Oazu Nantoi (2009) underlines that the civil society 
programme remains without a proper start. 
The main actor that has 
political and economical 
opportunity to improve 
the CSO peace activities 
is the European Union. 
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On the whole, the EU looks unable to create partnerships with CSOs 
that professionalize them in the field at all stages and levels of conflict inter-
vention. In EU documents, the involvement of civil society in peacebuilding 
is regarded as essential. However, in the concrete case of the Moldova-
Transnistria conflict, there is a lack of recognition on conflict transformation 
and peacebuilding by civil society,33 even if emphasis is shifting in recent years 
from diplomatic talks to supporting civil society activities. The main point 
is that no specialized peacebuilding cross-conflict projects have been sup-
ported so far. Besides, CSOs in peacebuilding are regarded as supplementary. 
This attitude extracts civil society from the conflict as if it were not a part 
of the conflict itself (Mirimanova, 2010). The EU justifies this approach by 
emphasizing how difficult it is to implement any “political” project through 
CSOs in Transnistria. However, in the previous section of this article, we 
showed different examples of how it is possible to work directly on the 
conflict dynamics involving the local civil societies. In addition, it must be 
considered that—differently from other conflict areas—in the Moldova-
Transnistria context it is relatively easy for civil society representatives to 
participate in meetings and events on the other side. 
The EU appears to offer more possibilities to change the conflict’s sta-
tus quo. According to Natalia Mirimanova (2010), in the near future the 
development of the EU Peacebuilding Partnership (PBP) may improve the 
EU support to CSOs working in the peacebuilding sector in the European 
Neighborhood. In fact, the PBP is recognizing peacebuilding as a profes-
sional field that requires specialised funding mechanisms. Furthermore, 
civil society organizations are recognised as key actors with expertise and 
skills (Dura, 2010; Mirimanova, 2010). These political choices on CSOs 
working in the peace sector will probably affect the EU’s attitude toward 
Moldova, the country in which the EU is investing the highest per capita 
amount of all Eastern neighboring countries.34 The EU is already investing 
a big slice of the Neighborhood Partnership cake supporting civil society 
and involving them in different ways.35 At the present time it also has the 
political support and tools to focus more on the direct conflict dynamics. 
The main limit may be that the EU has a clear view of the type of resolution 
which is desired—Transnistria remaining part of Moldova—and this may 
lead to a loss of trust on Transnistrian CSOs. However, this can be reduced 
by the positive impact of funds allocated for other sectors in Transnistria. 
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ConClusions
Since the beginning of the Moldovan-Transnistrian conflict, local and 
foreign CSOs were involved in several peacebuilding and peacemaking 
initiatives. This study firstly showed that these projects are a small part of 
the programmes financed by the main donors. However, they contribute 
to reduce micro and meso violence creating the necessary preconditions 
(Dura 2010) to help the population on the two banks of the Nistru/Dniestr 
River to keep collaborating in many sectors. 
The examples reported by Ronald Fisher (2007) and other initiatives 
considered in the study show how CSOs can also contribute to official 
diplomacy in this context. Here, indeed, many organizations are still having 
contacts and exchanges with similar organizations of the other side and for 
them it is not difficult to cross the river. 
However, mainly due to the general conditions of Moldovan civil soci-
ety, none of the local CSOs are focusing only on peace efforts, but all are 
mixing several sectors (human and civil rights, social care, etc.). Therefore, 
the specific know-how of these organizations in the peace sector is on 
average quite low. This situation is also due to the fact that the majority of 
donor interventions in Transnistria—except the DFID or few other quoted 
examples—are not focussed directly on conflict resolution, but, mainly, on 
social, agricultural or medical issues or on the indirect effects of the conflict. 
The refusal of the Transnistrian authorities to work directly on the conflict 
is considered the main cause of this lack. Nevertheless, the peace efforts 
promoted by CSOs and presented in this study show that it is possible to 
work on both track one and track two through the non-governmental actors. 
We also argue that the “peripheral vision” of CSOs on conflict transforma-
tion approach is not very supported by the political institutions. Mainly, 
the EU is currently showing interest in supporting direct “interventions 
and peacebuilding by civil society on the peace as change versus peace as 
stability approach and the notion of civil society as an institutional basis for 
peacebuilding ” (Mirimanova 2010: 37) and this process may also involve 
Moldova, and contribute with new tools to unfreeze the conflict toward a 
suitable and lasting agreement. 
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notes
1. The region takes the name from the “Dniestr” River—in Romanian 
“Nistru”—which divides the area from the rest of Moldova. 
2. It is not possible to describe the whole historical background in this 
study. Oazu Nantoi (2009) wrote a well-balance article, briefly describing the 
main historical aspects of the conflict. 
3. Gagauzia, a southern region of Moldova, declared independence on 19 
August 1990, before then Transnistria, but the Moldovan and Gagauzian lead-
erships agreed on the decentralization of political power and the creation of an 
autonomous territorial status in 1995. 
4. NGOs and parliamentary commissions increasingly work together in the 
legislative drafting process and in ad hoc working groups.
5. Another example of cooperation between NGOs and government is the 
drafting of the “Law on Assembly,” which was achieved with the direct involve-
ment of three organizations (CReDO, Promo-Lex and Amnesty International 
Moldova).
6. For instance, Doroftei and Nantoi (2009) show that from the 30-40 
NGOs which were involved in the capacity-building component of the “Peace 
Building Framework Programme’, “only ten remained active and very few—
approximately three—have better capacity and sustainability at present” (p. 23). 
7. For instance, the Institute for Public Policy (2007) wrote about 3,700 
NGOs. One of the methodological misunderstandings is the same definition of 
“NGO” itself: instead of using the standard Western definition, all voluntary 
associations are invariably classified as NGOs.
8. This attempt to address the “data problem” with a framed and organic 
comparative approach in Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia since 1997 is 
the first in this sense.
9. The detailed results in a range from 0 (ideal situation) to 7 (worst situa-
tion) are: advocacy (3.7), infrastructure (3.7), financial viability (5.2), legal envi-
ronment (4.3), NGO sustainability (4.2), organizational capacity (4.1), service 
provision (4.5), and public image (4.2). 
10. In October 2008 the results were quite different: 52 percent of the pop-
ulation had little or no trust in NGOs and only 21 percent of the population 
expressed relative or total trust in NGOs (IPP, 2008). The main reasons of this 
growth of trust are: the profitable work of the coalition monitoring the Parlia-
mentary elections, the organization in November 2008 of the Nation Forum of 
NGOs and the approval by the Forum of a “Code of Ethics of NGOs’. The range 
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of trust since November 2001 to November 2009 was between 20 percent (Nov. 
2002) and 38.7 percent (May 2007) (IPP, 2009). 
11. Other laws with regard to CSOs are: law on public associations of 23 
January 1997 (modified in 2007), the law on foundations of 28 October 1999, 
the section on NGOs in the Civil Code, the law on philanthropy and sponsor-
ship of 25 December 2002. Many of these laws were drafted with the assistance 
of Moldovan CSOs (Dura, 2010). 
12. NGOs, as private companies, have to pay all taxes. An NGO is exempt 
from paying income tax only if it has obtained a “Public Benefit Certificate.” 
However, this Certificate does not allow an NGO to recover VAT on purchased 
goods or services.
13. The most important legislative acts regulating the activities of NGOs 
in the Republic of Moldova are: Law on Public Associations, no. 837-XIII of 
17.05.1996; Law on Foundations, no. 581-XIV of 30.07.1999; Law on Philan-
thropy and Sponsorship, no.1420-XV of 31.10.2002; Civil Code, no. 1107-XV 
of 06.06.2002; Parliament Decree no. 373-XVI of 29.12.2005 on the Approval 
of the Concept of Co-operation between the Parliament and Civil Society. 
According to USAID (2008: 165), “Amendments to the Law on Civil Associa-
tions made in 2007 excluded three out of four legal forms of NGO, allowing only 
NGOs in the form of civic associations to have the organizational and juridical 
status of a legal entity. All other NGOs must re-register in the legal form of civil 
associations. These changes affect a substantial number of NGOs whose status 
no longer exists under the law. Many of them lack clarity on whether they should 
re-register as associations or not, and they face a cumbersome registration proce-
dure.” In 2008, UNDP Moldova financed the development of an electronic reg-
istry of NGOs within the Ministry of Justice, which may improve management 
and access to data on NGOs.
14. Andrea Bartoli (2009: 393) declares that “the use of NGOs in conflict 
resolution reveals a certain ‘maturity’ of the state.” 
15. In any circumstance and activity, authentic peacebuilding processes is 
home-grown and not imposed from outside, even if it can be supported by for-
eign funds. 
16. The core idea is to create “interaction that change attitudes and percep-
tions and allow parties to explore options and develop solutions outside of the 
charged arena of formal negotiations” (Fisher, 2007: 311).
17. The other four are: Azerbaijan/Nagorno-Karabakh, Indonesia/Moluc-
cas, Nicaragua and the Solomon Islands.
18. For instance, Mikhelidze and Pirozzi (2008) claim that “In general 
NGOs and research institutes are engaged with projects related to European inte-
gration and not with conflict resolution issues” (p. 40) and “There is practically 
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no interaction between Moldovan and Transnistrian NGOs, not least because of 
the tight cap on Transnistrian organizations” (p. 37).
19. MICOM obtained funds from different donors, for instance Charities 
Aid Foundation (UK) and the C. S. Mott Foundation (USA).
20. JCDC is an independent voluntary group created in 1992 that comprises 
men and women from Moldova and Transnistria.
21. Among these, the setting up of an information centre for NGOs, a 
mutual jazz festival in Bender, a programme for assistance to unemployed people 
in Transnistria and a rehabilitation programme that assists people who suffered 
from the Transnistria conflict and the Afghan war.
22. The constitutional document approved at Kiev has lately been superseded 
by a proposed federal constitutional document which includes some elements of 
the earlier document (Fisher 2007).
23. The project was financed by the British Embassy, Chişinău, with £ 238,973. 
The exact title of the project is “Making Visible the Economic and Social Costs of 
Frozen Conflict and Benefits of Peace—Moldova-Transnistria.” The partners of 
the project were: Romanian Peace Institute (PATRIR), Cluj-Napoca, Romania; 
Center for Strategic Studies and Reforms (CISR), Chişinău; “Independent Centre 
for Analytical Research “New Age”’, Tiraspol; “Joint Commission for Democ-
ratisation and Conciliation” (JCDC), Chişinău; “Russian Information Agency 
“New Region”’—Pridnestrovie’, Tiraspol; “Center for Independent Television 
Development,” Chişinău.
24. The project also produced a documentary entitled “Transnistria: When 
the Guns Fell Silent.” 
25. The “Center for Independent Television Development” and Russian 
Information Agency “New Region”, for instance, are partners of the project. Great 
attention was dedicated to press releases and to those in different media, with two 
people focusing on it (http://impact-project.org/index.shtml?apc=et1n16, June 
2010). 
26. From a budgetary point of view, on £30 million committed, more than 
one thousand projects were on this budget line. 
27. For instance, “Contact,” “Independent Journalism Center,” “Foreign 
Policy Association’, etc. 
28. However, DFID is closing its bilateral programme in Moldova in March 
2011 because Moldova no longer fits the category of world’s poorest countries 
having reached Middle-Income Country status in January 2009. DFID declared 
that in the coming years, the UK will continue to support Moldova in its goal of 
joining the EU through funds managed by Embassy, the European Commission, 
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank.
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29. Resource Centre for Human Rights (CReDO), Centre for Minority 
Issues, and Association of the Ukrainian Youth in Republic of Moldova ZLA-
GODA. 
30. The project partners are: CreDO (Moldova), JCDC (Moldova), “World 
Window” (Transnistria) and PATRIR (Romania).
31. This was confirmed even by Ina Pislaru of the Chişinău staff during a talk 
with the author hold the 21 of July 2009. 
32. The main NGOs implementing Soros Foundation’s projects are “Promo-
LEX” and “Contact Center.” 
33. Parallel apolitical projects in areas directly or indirectly related to the 
conflict (i.e. social care, ecology, health) receive funding from the EU Delegation 
in Moldova mainly through the UNDP. In 2009 the EU earmarked £ 1.8 million 
for projects in these fields. The EU has the funds and a political agenda while the 
UNDP has know-how (Dura, 2010). 
34. 209.7 million Euros for Moldova under the European Neighbourhood 
Partnership Instrument (ENPI) for the National Indicative Programme of 2007-
2010. 
35. For instance, Moldovan CSOs have been monitoring the implementa-
tion of the EU-Moldova Action Plan (including on the Transnistria issue). CSOs 
have also become involved in the early stages of drafting new legislation on anti-
corruption or strengthening the independence of the judiciary (Dura, 2010).
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